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Abstract 
Broadly applied traditional frameworks for assessing efficiency of economic organizations in 
agriculture are (only) based on the “technical efficiency” of the factors of production and the 
“productivity of employed resources”. They compare the levels of efficiency of farms of different 
types, sectors, and countries without taking into account the transaction costs and the specific 
economic, institutional and natural environment of their development. At the same time, other 
agrarian organizations (contracts, associations, markets, public and hybrid forms) are not 
considered as alternative economic structures and are either ignored or studies separately.  
This paper suggests a new approach for assessing efficiency of economic organizations and 
public intervention in agriculture incorporating achievements of the interdisciplinary New 
Institutional Economics. Presented new approach includes: studying out the farm and agrarian 
organizations as a governing rather than a production structure; assessment of the comparative 
efficiency of alternative market, contract, internal, and hybrid modes of governance on the base 
of their potential to minimise production and transaction costs and to maximise the production 
and transaction benefits; analysis of the level of transaction costs and their institutional 
(distribution of rights and obligations, and the systems of their enforcements), behavioural 
(preferences, bounded rationality and opportunism of individuals), dimensional (uncertainty, 
frequency, assets specificity and appropriability of activity/transactions), technological 
(non-separability, economies of scale and scope) and natural factors; and determination of 
adequate criteria of farm efficiency and its effective boundaries – the potential to increase 
productivity of resources with minimum transaction costs comparing to a practically possible 
alternative organisation.  
The new approach is also used to precise the needs for public interventions (“the economic role 
of government”) in agrarian sector and to assess the comparative efficiency of alternative forms 
of public involvement. The analysis of socio-economic and natural environment and the 
transaction costs identifies a multiple cases of “market and private failures” associated with 
non-identified or badly assigned property rights, ineffective system of enforcement of absolute 
and contracted rights, high uncertainty and dependency of activity, low appropriability, needs for 
collective actions etc. which necessitate a third-party public intervention in market and private 
sectors. The individual forms of public involvement (institutional modernisation, assistance, 
regulation, taxation, hybrid or internal organisation) are with unequal efficiency in the specific 
environment of different countries, regions, and sectors, and the most efficient one(s) is/are to be 
selected with taking into account the total (direct, private, public, transaction, third-party etc.) 
costs and the contribution to the sustainable development. Nevertheless, “the public failure” is 
feasible and bad interventions, delayed, under or over-regulations, miss-management, corruption 
etc. are widespread and as a result the sustainable development of the sector is compromised.   
 
JEL Classifications: Q01, Q12, Q13, Q15, Q18  
Keywords: efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations; market, private and public 
governance 
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Introduction 
 
Around the globe the issue of assessment of efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations 
is among the most topical in the discussions of researchers, farmers, investors, politicians, and 
the public at large2.  
Unprecedented development in the theory of economic organisations in the past decades 
has brought about to a significant evolution in understanding of essence and efficiency of 
agrarian organisations as well3. Despite that specific and partial approaches for assessing the 
efficiency of farms and other economic organisations in agriculture are predominately used. 
Efficiency of agrarian organizations is usually evaluated (only) through „technical efficiency” of 
production factors and “productivity of employed resources”. Comparisons are made of levels of 
efficiency across farms of different type, sectors and countries independent to the specific 
economic, institutional or natural environment of their development. Not corresponding to the 
real world „ideal” models and sizes of “effective” (livestock, greenhouse) enterprises are 
recommended based on optimization of technological factors of production and/or experiences in 
other regions and countries. On the other hand, the other agrarian organizations (contracts, 
associations, markets, public forms) are not considered as alternative structures but are ignored or 
studied separately.   
In more sophisticated models of the Neoclassical Economics the criteria for assessing 
efficiency of an organization is derived from the equilibrium condition of the entire economic 
system – when marginal income is equalized with the marginal costs4. According to such 
simplified understanding of the economy the entire activity of agents is governed by a single free 
market mode. Organizations using resources with different (higher, lower) from marginal 
productivity are inefficient. The rare cases of „market failure” (tragedy of commons, externalities) 
are easily detected and timely corrected though „perfect” government intervention. 
Traditional approach for assessing economic organizations can not give answer to the 
question: why there exist so many organizations performing with a great variation in efficiency 
for a long period of time. For instance, all analysis show a high sustainability of “inefficient” 
organizations in Bulgarian agriculture - unproductive (semi)market farms, production 
cooperatives with profitability several times lower than private farms, sub-sectors with “return on 
resources” bellow the agricultural average, inefficient contractual and vertically integrated 
arrangements, not-working public organizations5. If efficiency of a particular organisation is low 
there will be always a strong private or public mechanism (competition, public intervention) for 
reallocation of resources to more effective application, and in the long run there will exist only 
                                                        
2 Gortova M. and S.Davidova (2003). Farm productivity and efficiency in the CEE applicant countries, Elsevier; 
Harvey J., Klein P. and M.Sykuta (2007). Markets, Contracts, or Integration? CORI; Mathijs E. and J. Swinnen 
(1997). Production Organization and Efficiency during Transition, PRG; Masterson T. (2007). Productivity, 
Technical Efficiency, and Farm Size in Paraguayan Agriculture, Levy Economics Institute; Sporleder T. (1992). 
Managerial Economics of Vertically Coordinated Agricultural Firms, Amer. J. Agric. Economics, 5, 1226-1231.  
3 Bachev, H. (2004). Efficiency of Agrarian Organizations, Farm Management and Rural Planning. 5, 135-150; 
Harvey J. and M. Sykuta (2005). Property Right and Organizational Characteristics of Producer-Owned Firms, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 4, 545-580. 
4 Pigou A. (1920). Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Co. 
5 Иванова Н. (2009). Икономическа ефективност на българските земеделски стопанства, специализирани в 
производството на зърно, грозде и зеленчуци, Икономика и управление на селското стопанство, 2, 51-61; 
Котева Н. (2011) Икономическа ефективност на земеделските стопанства, Икономика и управление на 
селското стопанство, 1; Bachev H. (2010). Management of Farm Contracts and Competitiveness, VDM Verlag. 
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“effective” organizations governing resources on (close to) socially acceptable level of efficiency. 
The traditional approach estimates and compare levels of efficiency of different 
organisations without even looking for answering the question: why there exist so big variety of 
organizations in a country, sub-sector of agriculture, geographical region etc. - one-person farms, 
group farms, registered cooperatives and firms of different kind, associations and joint ventures, 
subsistent farms, part-time and full-time farms, small and large farms, contractually or 
fully-integrated forms, hybrid (public-private) organisations. Therefore, in the narrow framework 
of approach restricting efficiency of economic organisations to production costs, it is neither 
possible to understand the economic logic of diverse agrarian organisation nor to assess their 
comparative efficiency and complementarities. 
This paper incorporates achievements of the New Institutional Economics6 and suggests 
adequate framework for assessing the efficiency of farms and diverse economic organizations in 
agriculture. The goal is to understand the role, factors, and efficiency of agrarian organisations, 
as well as to assist organisational design of farms, collective actions of agrarian agents, and 
public policy in the sector. 
 
Agrarian organizations as a governance structure 
 
Newly developing methodology of the New Institutional Economics explains existence of 
diverse economic organizations with their role to govern relations between individual agents and 
minimize on transaction costs. Carrying out agricultural activity and related exchange (land and 
labor supply, financing, marketing of output) is usually associated with significant (transaction) 
costs. For instance, there are costs for complying with institutional requirements (laws, standards, 
informal norms), finding best prices and partners; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract 
writing and registration; enforcing negotiated terms; dispute resolution (including though court or 
another way); adjusting or termination along with evolving conditions etc. 
Division and specialization of labor, and related exchange and cooperation, open up 
enormous opportunities for increasing productivity and welfare. They create possibilities and 
incentives for deepening specialization and exchanges. However, they are also associated with 
additional transaction costs. The high costs of outside exchange make it more profitable to carry 
out division and cooperation of labor (a transaction) within a certain organization (firm, group 
farm) instead across the market. For instance, a specialized livestock farm organizes internally a 
crop production activity (hiring additional labor, farmland) because of significant costs and risks 
for market procurement of forage. Internal management of transactions is also associated with 
costs (for directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; coordination and controlling partners 
activity) which restricts unlimited expansion of borders of (internal) organization. Thus a 
transaction (activity) will be carried in an organization if the costs are lower than for governing 
that transaction across market or in another organization7.  
Usually, every agrarian activity and exchange could be governed through a great variety of 
alterative forms8. One extreme for the farm manager is to specialize exclusively in governing of 
                                                        
6 Coase R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, 386-405; Furuboth E. and R. Richter (1998). Institutions 
and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press; Williamson O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
7 Coase R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, 386-405.  
8  In agriculture it is almost impossible to give examples where the organizational form is unilaterally 
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market transactions (rather than production management) - leasing-in farmland and long-term 
material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and harvesting of output, buying needed 
short-term material assets, selling all primary products on market. Another extreme is a close 
one-person or group farm – the farmer(s) employ only own resources  and labor, and consume 
the entire product. Between these two polls there is a spectrum of feasible modes for governing 
of agrarian activity and exchange. For instance, “cultivation of land by a tractor” can be governed 
in numerous ways: the farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a tractor 
(input and credit supply interlinked contract), and use it for cultivation of land; the farmer could 
buy once or multiple times cultivation service from market (spot-light of long-term service 
contract); a number of farmers may buy jointly a tractor (joint ownership) and use it in a group 
(producers cooperative) or individually; the farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation 
services (non for profit organization); the farmer may lease the land out to a tractor owner and 
share the output (tenancy contract with fix or share rent); the farmer can hire a tractorist to work 
on farm (employment contract), and may even sell out the cultivation service (profit making 
organization); the cultivation services to farms could be subsidized by the Government (trilateral 
mode), or provided by a municipality or a state company (public organization) etc. Depending on 
comparative efficiency of practically possible forms preference will be given to one or another 
organisation of activity/exchange. 
Consequently, distribution of overall activities between different farms, agrarian 
organizations, and markets will be determined by comparative costs for using various governing 
arrangements as the most efficient one(s) minimizing the total (internal and external) transaction 
cost will prevail in the long run. The economic efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations 
should take into account not only their capacity to minimize production costs, but also ability to 
economize on transaction costs. While the production costs are cost associated with proper 
technology (“combination of production factors”) of certain farming, eco-conservation etc. 
activity, the transaction costs are costs for governing relations between individuals (for adaptation 
to institutional restrictions, coordination of activity, protection and exchange of various rights 
etc.). Moreover, both (current) costs for using individual organizations and long-term costs for 
their development (initiation, maintenance, modernization, liquidation) have to be taken into 
account. 
 If the execution of activity and exchange was not associated with transaction costs (“zero 
transaction costs”) then the mode of organization would have no economic importance9. The 
individuals would govern their relationships with same efficiency though free market (adapting to 
price movements), and private modes of different types (contracts, firms), and collective 
decision-making (cooperative, association), and a nationwide hierarchy (single private/state 
company). Then the technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope for production 
of socially needed products and services (maximum productivity of resources, “internalization of 
externalities”) would be easily achieved 10 . All information for the effective potential of 
transactions (optimization of resources, meeting demands, respecting rights and rules) would be 
costlessly available to everybody, and individuals would costlessly define new rights, and protect 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(pre)determined by technology, and with the same production technology are possible many forms of organizations.  
9 Williamson O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
10 Coase R. (1960). The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44. 
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absolute11 and contracted rights, and trade (exchange) owned resources in mutual benefit until 
exhausting possibilities for increasing productivity and welfare (“Pareto efficiency”). 
However, often the high transaction costs make it difficult or even block otherwise efficient 
(mutually beneficial) for all parties activity and exchange. For instance, despite the high pay-off 
of investments in agrarian research and innovation, the market and private agents do not organize 
(at all, socially desirable scale) such activity/transactions because of the high uncertainty and low 
(market and private) appropriability of investment. 
Since carrying out agrarian activity is connected with transaction costs, the “rational” 
agents will seek, chose, and develop such modes for organization of activity and exchanges 
which maximize transacting benefits and minimize transaction costs. The type of economic 
organization is crucial since various governing modes give unequal possibilities for participants 
to explore social and technological opportunities (meeting demands, economies of scale and 
scope, non-separability of activity), coordinate and adapt transactions, stimulate acceptable 
behaviour of counterparts, control and protect from unwanted expropriation investments etc. In 
the long-run inefficient forms will be abandoned and only effective modes for organization of 
agrarian activity and exchange will dominate. 
Each activity  and transaction has different specific characteristics varying according to 
the institutional environment (legislation, efficiency of public enforcement of laws and private 
contract, other formal and informal restrictions), personal characteristics of agents (preferences, 
accumulated experience, established reputation, tendency for opportunistic behavior, risk 
aversion), macroeconomic conditions (economic stability, foreign trade regime, available state 
support), dominant technologies (mechanization and standardization of operations, application of 
information technologies), and natural environment (recourses endowment, dependency). There 
exist no singe most efficient form for organization of all agrarian activity and transactions in all 
practically possible economic, institutional and natural settings. According to the critical 
dimensions of activity/exchange the agrarian agents will use the most appropriate (effective) 
mode for governance. In any particular moment the entire agrarian activity and allocation of 
resources will be carried out (governed) through a great variety of economic organizations: part 
of it will be within a classical one-person farm (firm), another part will be managed though a 
special contract modes (“private order”) between independent partners, the third part be 
coordinated by the movement of market prices and market competition (‘invisible market hand”), 
part will be organized though collective decision-making (partnership, cooperative), another part 
will ne will be managed internally by a manager or more complex hierarchical structures, some 
will be supported by a third party (Government, international assistance), or would require more 
complicated and hybrid modes.  
Transaction costs minimizing “logic” helps us understand the evolution and efficiency of 
modern agrarian organizations – the dynamics in development and potential of diverse type of 
farms (subsistent, semi-market, group, for profit or non for profit orientation, corporate) and 
coalitions; economic horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms (extension of internal division 
and specialization of labor, product diversification, decisions to “make of buy”, “sell or continue 
processing”, “buy or rent”, “organize production or transfer-out user rights on resources); divers 
kind of contracts (classical, neoclassical, trilateral, long-term, interlinked) for supply of land, 
labor, services, resources, innovation, finance, risk management, marketing; economic needs for 
                                                        
11 Formal and informal rights of individuals, groups, and generations defined by the institutional environment.  
 6
cooperation with competitors (in inputs supply, marketing, environmental conservation, lobbying) 
or vertical (downstream, upstream) counterparts; forms of management of natural resources and 
eco-system services; pace and limits of development of agrarian and related markets; needs for 
and efficiency of state and/or international intervention etc12.  
 What is more, efficiency of particular organization can hardly be assessed without 
analyzing efficiency of complementary and/or competing organization(s). For instance, “high” 
efficiency of small-scale farms and producers (inputs supply, marketing) organizations in most 
countries can not be properly evaluated without analyzing their high complementarities. 
Furthermore, depending on dominating public organizations (public provision, support, 
preferences), individual market and/or private organizations would have quite dissimilar 
efficiency for different agents.    
What is more, efficiency of a particular organization can not be properly assessed without 
analyzing the efficiency of complementary and/or competitive organization/s. For instance, the 
“high” efficiency” of numerous small (and domestic) farms and production cooperatives during 
post-communist transition in Bulgaria can hardly be properly evaluated without analyzing their 
high complementarities13.  
According to the dominant institutional environment (distribution of formal and informal 
rights and obligations between individuals and groups, and efficiency of enforcement of “rules of 
the game”) and the forms of public involvement (state provision, assistance regulation), the 
individual market and/or private organizations will be with quite dissimilar efficiency for 
different agents and sectors. For instance, in transitional conditions of not well-defined and 
assigned private rights on farmland, and the high costs for their protection and exchange, the 
short-term lease and the internal integration (subsistence and semi-market farming, production 
cooperation) were the most efficient forms for organization of land supply in Bulgarian 
agriculture. Therefore, specific institutional environment in which economic activity is carried 
out is the key parameter, which eventually (pre)determine the type and pace of socio-economic 
development of a particular social group, region, sector of economy, country etc14. 
Thus in the real world with incomplete and not-well defined and enforced rights, and 
positive transaction costs, the farm and other agrarian organizations have a significant economic 
role. Farms are not only production but a major governance structures – the forms for 
organization of transactions and for minimization of transaction costs. The efficiency of different 
type of farms can nit be properly understood and assessed without analyzing their comparative 
production and governance potential. It must be abandoned commonly used Nirvana approach 
for evaluating organizational forms as “good” or “bad” for their own, or on the basis of a specific 
(technical, distributional, financial, ecological) type efficiency, or in a comparison with some 
non-feasible (ideal, institutional and transaction costs free, in other countries etc.) model. The 
evaluation is to be directed to finding out the comparative advantages for initiating, establishing, 
using, management, adaptation, intensification, coordination, stimulation and controlling of the 
alternative and really possible modes of governance in the specific market, institutional, 
technological and natural environment.  
 
                                                        
12 Analysis of efficiency of agrarian organizations during transition and European integration in Bulgaria is done by Bachev H. 
(2010). Management of Farm Contracts and Competitiveness, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag. 
13 Bachev H. (2010). Governance of Agrarian Sustainability, New York: Nova Science Publisher.  
14 North D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. 
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Factors for choice of organizational form 
 
Individual forms of governance have specific advantages and disadvantages for protection 
of rights of participants, and coordination and stimulation of socially needed agricultural activity 
(production of food and feed, materials for industry, environmental conservation etc.). They are 
alternative but not equally efficient modes for organization of individual activity/transactions 
since they have different features (advantages, disadvantages) to coordinate, control, and 
stimulate (maximize benefits from, minimize costs of) transactions. 
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand of 
market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from 
specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with high 
uncertainty, risk, and costs due to lack of adequate information, price instability, possibility for 
opportunistic behaviour, “missing market” situation etc.  
The special contract form (private ordering) permits better coordination, intensification, and 
safeguard of activity/exchange. However, it may require large costs for specification, writing 
down and registration of contract provisions, controlling contract implementation, adjustments 
with constant changes in conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc. 
The internal (ownership) organization allows greater flexibility and control on activity 
(direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, dispute resolution by fiat). However, extension of 
internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries command significant costs for 
coalition (finding partners, design, registration, restructuring), and current management 
(collective decision-making, control on coalition members opportunism, direction, supervision 
and motivation of hired labour). The separation of the ownership from the management 
(cooperative, corporation) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and 
transacting efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies of 
scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in product 
promotion, brand names, relations with counterparts and authorities. However, it could be 
connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, and adaptation. The 
cooperative and the non-for profit form also suffers from low capability for internal long-term 
investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable character of shares (horizon problem). 
Which one from the principle form of organisation of activity and transactions will be used 
depends on comparative efficiency (transaction costs) of practically possible alternatives. The 
transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
opportunism15. Agrarian agents do not possess full information about the economic system (price 
ranges, demands, trade opportunities, development trends) since collection and processing of 
such information is very expensive or impossible (multiple markets, future events, partners 
intention for cheating). In order to optimize decision-making they have to spent costs for 
“increasing their imperfect rationality” - data collection, analysis, forecasting, training, 
consultation. 
Economic agents are also given to opportunism and if there is an opportunity for some of 
transacting sides to get non-punishably extra benefit/rent from exchange he will likely to take an 
advantage of that. Three major forms of opportunism can be distinguished: pre-contractual 
                                                        
15 Williamson О. (1981). The Economics of Organization. The American Journal of Sociology 87 (3), 548–577. 
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(adverse selection) - when some of the partners use the “information asymmetry” to negotiate 
better contract terms; post-contractual (moral hazard) - when some counterpart takes advantage 
of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner, a third-party) or when 
he takes “legal advantages” of unpredicted changes in exchange conditions (costs, prices, formal 
regulations). The third form (free ride) occurs in development of large organizations where 
individual benefits are not-proportional to individual efforts (costs). The trend is everyone to 
expect others to invest in organizational development, and benefit from the new organization in 
case of a success16.  
It is often very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic 
behavior because of the bounded rationality of agents (e.g. farmer finds out that purchased seeds 
are not high quality only during harvesting time). Agrarian agents have to protect their rights, 
investments, and transactions from hazard of opportunism through: ex-ante efforts to find reliable 
counterpart and design efficient mode for partners credible commitments; and ex-post 
investments for overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of 
possible opportunism during contract execution stage17.     
Besides the transaction costs, the choice of economic organization also depends on a 
number of additional important factors: First, personal characteristics of individual agents – 
preferences, ideology, knowledge, capability, risk-aversion, reputation, trust, “contractual” power. 
For instance, farming organization is often restricted to a family partnership; in some cultures, the 
cooperative is the preferred mode of agrarian organization. If the farmer is a good manager he 
will design, control and run a bigger (more effective) organization adapted to his specific needs - 
manage effectively more internal (hired labor) and outside (market and contract) transactions. A 
risk-taking farmer prefers risky but more productive forms - e.g. bank credit for a new profitable 
venture. When counterparts are family members or close friends there is no need for complex 
organization since relations are “governed” by the high mutual confidence, good will, and 
common interests of parties. Benefits for farmers could take different forms: monetary or 
non-monetary income, profit, indirect revenue, pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise, 
enjoyment in agriculture, desire for involvement in environment or heritage preservation, 
increased leisure and free time, other non-economic benefits. 
Second, institutional environment - formal and/or informally imposed social order (“rules of 
the game”) and associated costs. Often the choice of governing mode is (pre)determined by the 
institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying farming activities, land and labor supply, 
trade of output etc. could be socially unacceptable, too expensive or illegal. For instance, 
corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many countries; market trade 
of farmland, natural resources, and some products/resources is illegitimate, private management 
of natural ecosystems is not allowed; some type of farms, agrarian property or transactions are 
with preferential tax regime. However, if costs associated with the illegitimate governance is not 
high (possibility for disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are 
considerable, then the more effective modes prevail – large gray or black economies are 
widespread around the globe. 
 The (external) institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs 
and thus the choice of economic organization. For instance, in recent years thousands of 
                                                        
16 Olson M. (1969). The Logic of Collective Actions: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard Univ. Press. 
17 Williamson O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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Bulgarian farms and organizations have been closed due to impossibility to adapt to new EU 
standards for quality, safety, environmental preservation, animal welfare etc. Principally, in 
conditions of stable and well-working public regulation (regulations, quality standards, price 
guarantees, quotas) and effective mechanisms for laws and contract enforcement, a preference is 
given to spotlight and classical/standard contracts. When rights on major agrarian resources 
(lands, waters, material assets) are not well defined, and absolute/contracted right effectively 
enforced, that lead to domination of primitive subsistence farming, personalized and 
over-integrated forms, unsustainable organizations, undeveloped and missing markets. 
 Third, natural and technological factors like non-separability and interdependency of 
activity, technological economies of size and scale etc. In rare cases there is only one practically 
possible form for governance of agrarian activity. For example, the natural minimal size of 
farming organisation is determined by a technological parameter such as non-separability of 
activity (e.g. biological non-separability of individual animal). In Japanese dispersed paddy 
agriculture water supply could not have been conducted by individual farmers (high 
interdependency, non-separability of water use) and since earliest period water use organization 
developed as a public project18. The effective governance of some environmental activities also 
requires a certain scale and thus collective actions at local, regional, national or transnational 
scale. However, beside these few examples, in farming is almost impossible to find cases where 
the form of governance is unilaterally determined by the technological parameters.  
Another technological factor, which can determine the form of governance (type and size of 
the farm) is possibility to explore technological economies of size and scale. For instance, in 
order to use a large harvester-combine the farmer extend the farms size, or produces two or more 
products with different technologies in order to utilize “free” resources (family labor). Generally, 
development of technology follows the demand in the sector and in fact is also a variable 
parameter 19 . What is more, maximal scale economies could be achieved not through 
internalization of activity but though market exchange of specialized activity – e.g. selling out or 
purchasing a service “harvesting with a combine”. Free resources of the farmer could also be 
traded (sold, leased-out) more effectively on market instead of being used in own non-specialized 
activity (opportunity costs rule). 
Actually, we can observe the opposite tendency – dependence of technological development 
from the governance structure. It is typical when the institutional restrictions (land transfer, hiring 
labor) and the high transaction costs (for outside financing/crediting) restrict realization of the 
potential of available technologies. Widespread application of primitive technologies is a rule 
rather then exception in agrarian sector. In other instances, the high transaction uncertainty or 
imperfect institutional arrangements lead to expansion of farm organization beyond the 
“technologically optimal” scale. In East Europe has been common “over-concentration” during 
communist period, and “over-integration and cooperation” in the following transition afterword. 
The ttechnological development affects enormously the structure and level of transaction 
costs. Mechanization and standardization of operations and products increases manageability and 
leads to extension of activities under a singe management enlarging internal (internal division 
and specialization of labor) and outside (market and contract procurement, trade, cooperation) 
transactions. Possibilities that progression of modern production, transportation, measurement, 
                                                        
18 Mori T. (1991). The History of Japanese Agriculture, in Agricultural Policy in Japan, IAAE Conference, Tokyo.  
19 Otherwise it is very difficult to explain the wide spreading of “small” machineries in agriculture.  
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communication etc. technologies gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and minimize 
costs are immense - easy assessment and traceability; on line information, coordination, 
monitoring, detecting, advise; direct low costs exchanges and collective actions of interested 
agents at national and international scales; rapid detection of problems and interventions by the 
government; full participation of individuals in and control on public decision-making etc. 
 
Criteria for the efficiency of farm 
 
The better understanding of the essence of agrarian organizations let us resize the criteria 
for economic efficiency of the farms as well. The “immediate combination” of the factors of 
production in agriculture will have to be carried out in such forms which optimize (minimize) the 
total production and transaction costs of participants. One farm will be efficient if (has a potential 
to) realize maximum possible productivity of resources with minimum transaction costs. 
According to that an increase in efficiency of an enterprise means improving productivity with 
the same transaction costs or decreasing the transaction costs for achieving certain productivity. 
The (maximum) efficiency of the farm is achieved when the potential for increasing productivity 
of resources is realized with the minimum transaction costs comparing to practically possible 
alternative organization. 
Often, the alternative organization of the farm (commercialization of internal transactions, 
transformation of one-person farm/firm into a coalition) is obviously more efficient since it 
increases the overall technological and transactional benefits with less overall costs (economies 
of scale and size). However, if changing the organization is associated with additional production 
benefits (reduction of production costs, growth in productivity and quality) at the expanse of 
additional transaction costs (management of a contract for finance supply, innovations and 
services, hiring labor), then the new organization will be efficient if there is a net benefit – when 
benefits in the form of growth in output, income, free time etc. are bigger then the growth of 
transaction costs.  
Methods for assessing the partial and overall productivity of resources (productivity, 
profitability, measurement of current and capital costs etc.) are well elaborated. What is a 
challenge is the “measurement” of transaction costs. One direction for is the direct comparison of 
costs for each transaction in different forms as organization which requires less costs is more 
efficient. For instance, a comparison is made whether is more beneficial own marketing of output 
or it is cheaper to use a marketing cooperative.  
Sometimes, the costs of transaction are easily determined since they are object of separate 
accountancy or can be easily specified. For instance, costs for registration, agro-market 
information, advertisement, court suits, guarding property, payment of bribes, (part of) losses 
from ineffective transactions (thefts, cheating, failed product) could be quite precisely specified.  
However, a portion of transaction costs is difficult (very expensive) or impossible to be 
determined. In the late group are included the costs for finding best partner, negotiation, 
enforcement of contractual terms, organizational development, interlinked transacting, unrealized 
and failed deals. It is often complicated to separate transaction costs from the traditional 
production expenditures20 – e.g. while executing farming operations a farmer supervises hired 
                                                        
20 All these difficulties make it impossible to use various models of Neoclassical economics through simple adding a 
new “transaction activity”.   
 11
labor; during inputs transportation he negotiates marketing of output. Approximate estimate for 
the level of transaction costs could be made by interviewing farm managers where they indicate 
the level (high, middle, low) of efforts/time devoted for governing different type transactions:  
for finding needed labor for hiring, land and material inputs for purchase and lease; negotiating 
terms of exchange; monitoring implementation of contractual obligations; adaptation of contracts 
to new conditions; conflicts resolution; memberships in professional organizations; relations with 
agrarian bureaucracy etc. 
Component comparison of transacting costs could not always give idea for the efficiency of 
organizations since often the alternative form decreases one type of costs while increasing 
another type transacting costs. For instance, internalization of a transaction (replacement of 
market with integral mode) is associated with reduction of costs for information supply 
(overcoming market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along with constantly changing 
conditions of exchange, safeguarding investments from outside opportunism etc. On the other 
hand, it enlarges costs for organizational formation, decision-making, integral management, 
supervising and motivation of hired labor. In above example with the alternatives for marketing 
of output it could be preferred “internal marketing” (consumption, production utilisation, 
processing) as more beneficial form of organization comparing to direct sell or employment of 
marketing cooperative. 
Moreover, a part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but through 
complex or interlinked modes - e.g. inputs supply in “package” with know-how, extension or/and 
service supply; joint supply of inputs and credit; crediting of production against marketing of 
output. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the overall costs for organization of 
transactions of different types - all external and internal transaction costs of the farm.  
Often it is very difficult to select a base for comparison in view that high transacting costs 
entirely block development of alternative organization. For instance, the market for agrarian 
credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the transition and the internal supply 
(utilization of own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible form for finance 
supply of farms. Here the comparative level of transaction costs is impossible to be determined 
and appreciate the “high” efficiency of integral mode relative to debt form of financing. In that 
case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are not real alternative but completely 
different governing structures. Thus, application of indicators for estimation of the comparative 
efficiency of investments based on “opportunity costs” (discounting, payback period, internal rate 
of return) independent from the form of funding, have no significant economic sense. 
 
Comparative structural analysis 
 
Another direction for evaluating efficiency of diverse agrarian organizations is the Discrete 
structural analysis21. Since it is either very difficult or impossible to determine absolute 
transaction costs for individual modes, assessment is made on comparative costs of alternative 
organizations. Besides, quantitative approach (absolute and relative measures, marginalism) is 
replaced by qualitative (structural) analysis and indirect assessment of transacting costs22. 
                                                        
21 Williamson O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
22 That is logical since individual governing structures differ each other not in marginal but qualitative –discrite 
structural way.  
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Actually, we are interested not in absolute level of transaction costs in different form, but in 
organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular activity/transaction. 
The new approach for assessing economic organizations turns individual transaction and the 
costs associated with it into a basic unit of economic analysis. The analysis of agrarian 
organizations includes following major steps: First, the major type transactions in which agent 
managing agrarian transactions (farm entrepreneurs, farmers) participates are to be determined. 
Second, the feasible alternative forms for organization of different type agrarian transactions in 
the specific environment are to be identified. Third, critical factors of transaction costs, and costs 
(and benefits) associated with alternative governing modes are to be specified. Forth, the 
comparative efficiency of alternative modes is to be assessed, and the effective boundaries of 
market and private organizations defined. Fifth, cases of market and private failures, and the 
needs for public intervention are to be identified. Six, the alternative (and feasible) forms for 
public intervention in agrarian sector are to be identified, their comparative efficiency assessed, 
the best one(s) selected.  
The major types transactions in farming are associated with: labor supply, supply of land 
and natural resources, service supply, inputs supply, knowledge supply and know-how, 
innovation supply, finance supply, insurance supply, marketing of services and products.  
Farmer also takes part in a great variety of “collective actions” for inducing public intervention in 
market and private sector in own interests. Identification of employed and other feasible forms 
for organizations of transactions in different countries, regions, subsectors is object of a special 
micro-economic survey23.  
Next, “critical dimensions” of transactions are to be determined – the factors responsible 
for the variation of transaction costs in the specific economic, institutional and natural 
environment. They are identified as: frequency of transactions between the same partners; 
uncertainty surrounding transactions; specificity of assets for supporting a particular transaction; 
appropriability of rights associated with transactions24. 
When recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, both (all) sides are 
interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, building 
reputation, setting up incentive and adjustment mechanisms, conflict resolution devices). Here 
continuation of the relations with a particular partner/s and designing a special mode for 
transacting has a high economic value. Parties restrain for opportunism which detection is 
“punished” by turning to a competitor (losing future business). Besides, costs for development of 
a special private mode for facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) exchange could be effectively 
recovered by frequent exchange. For instance, instead of negotiating milk marketing after “each 
milking” a long-term supply contract is signed; instead of negotiating labor remuneration “for 
each operation” a permanent labor is hired by the cooperative; economies of scale and size for 
repeated transactions are realized though participation in inputs supply or marketing cooperative.  
When a transaction is occasional (incidental) then possibility for opportunism is great since 
cheating side can not be easily punished (good reputation is not of value).  
When uncertainty surrounding transactions increases, then costs for carrying out and secure 
                                                        
23 E.g. the major forms for organizations in functional areas of Bulgarian farms are analyzed by Bachev H. (2010). 
Management of Farm Contracts and Competitiveness, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag. 
24 First three factors are identified by Williamson O. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford 
University Press, while the forth one added by Bachev H. and M.Labonne. About Organization of Agrarian 
Innovations. Montpellier: INRA, (2000). 
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transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding against risk). Since 
bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerge agents will use such modes of 
organization which diminish transaction uncertainty. While certain risks could be 
diminished/eliminated by production management or through market mode (purchase of 
insurance) most transacting risk would require special private forms – trade with origins; 
providing guarantees; using share-rent or output-based compensation; employing economic 
hostages (e.g. obligatory collateral for providing a credit); participating in inputs-supply or 
marketing cooperative; complete integration of transactions. When transacting between same 
counterparts is rare, and it is not supported by specific assets, and private appropriability of rights 
is high, then faceless market exchange is most efficient mode. Depending on the level of 
uncertainty and the risk-aversion agents take different entrepreneurial risk and get normal, lower, 
or higher return from transactions. 
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with particular partner are 
to be deployed. In this case it is impossible to change partner (alternative use of assets) without 
big loss in value of specific capital25. Relation specific/dependent investments are “locked” in 
transactions with particular buyer or seller and cannot be recovered (rented) through “faceless” 
market transactions (counterpart’s “personality” matters)26. Costless alternative use of specific 
assets (loss of value) is not possible if transactions fail to occur, they are prematurely terminated, 
or less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal time before the end of life-span of 
specific capital). Therefore, dependant investment/assets have to be safeguarded by special form 
such as long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, quasi or 
complete integration. Often, later is quite expensive, investment in specific capital are not made, 
and activity/transactions can not take place (e.g. modern drop irrigation) or occurs without (or 
loss of) comparative advantages in respect to productivity (no or manual irrigation). 
If a high symmetrical (capacity, product, timing, location etc.) dependency of assets of 
counterparts exists (regime of “bilateral trade”) there are strong incentives in both parties to 
elaborate special private mode of governance. When unilateral (asymmetrical) dependency 
exists then dependent side (facing mini or total monopoly) has to protect investments against 
possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty/certainty) through integrating transactions (unified 
organization, joint ownership, cooperative); or safeguarding them with interlinked contract, 
exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization to outstand 
asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations).  
Activity and transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on products, 
services or resources is low. “Natural” low appropriability has most of agrarian intellectual 
products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new varieties and 
technologies etc. Besides, all products and activities with significant positive/ or negative 
externalities are to be included in this group. If appropriability is low possibility for unwanted 
market or private exchange is great, and costs for protection (safeguard, detection of cheating, 
disputing) of private rights/investments extremely high27. Because of the bounded rationality, the 
costs for protection, detection, verification, and a third-party (court) punishment of unwanted 
exchange extremely high. For transactions with low appropriability costs and benefits are 
                                                        
25 E.g. investments in production of organic milk are strongly specific for transactions with the single organic milk 
processor on the country.  
26 Specificity is not technological but economic characteristic of investments. Depending on socio-economic 
conditions the same assets could be with quite different level of specificity. 
27 E.g. fight against hail clouds or grasshoppers invasion are with a low appropriability for supplier since paying or 
not all farmers in the region benefit from the service. Investments in development of a new technology are with low 
appropriability since it could be “introduced” with one time purchase or acquired for free by a neighbor, friend in 
the research institute, or black market.  
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independent for individual participants. Therefore, agents would either over-produce (negative 
externalities) or under-organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are governed by 
efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade 
secrets, or public order. 
 
Effective forms for agrarian organizations 
 
The next step is to evaluate the effective potential of alternative economic organizations: to 
minimize bounded rationality of agents and uncertainty surrounding transactions; appropriation 
and protection of absolute/contracted rights (and associated private benefits and investment) 
from possible opportunism; recover long-term costs for organizational development through high 
frequency of transactions; explore economy of size and scale on specific capital etc.  
Individual organizations have different comparative advantages and disadvantages to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs of transactions with specific critical dimensions. In 
general, internal organization/integration has advantage for governing transaction with high 
uncertainty and specificity (dependency) of assets, since it diminishes bounded rationality and 
protects investments from outside opportunism. Contrary, transactions with high certainty 
(bounded rationality is not important) and universal character of assets (opportunism can not be 
realized since transaction can be executed with another partner without additional costs) can be 
carried across free market without encountering costs for development of special private mode. 
Private organization is effective only for transactions with high recurrence between partners, 
since occasional (single) transactions do not let recovering (“payback”) investment for 
development of special governance mode (mechanisms for coordination, stimulation, dispute 
resolution; formal registration). Finally, markets and private forms are appropriate for 
transactions with high appropriability, since they would recover invested resources through 
exchange. For transaction with low appropriability private rights cannot be protected (unwanted 
exchange) or they are enforced with extremely high costs. Thus, such transactions could be 
effectively governed either by hybrid (mixed public-private, quasi-public) or entirely public 
forms for organization. 
Since transactions have different critical dimensions and governance forms have different 
comparative advantages it is to be “alignment of transactions (which differ in attributes) with 
governance structures (which differ in costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly 
transaction cost economizing) way” 28. According to the combination of specific characteristics 
of each activity/transaction, there will be different the most effective form of economic 
organization for that particular activity (Figure 1). Agrarian transactions with good 
appropriability, high certainty, and universal character of investments (partner can be changed 
anytime without significant costs) could be effectively carried across free market through 
spotlight or classical contracts. Here organization of transactions with special form or within 
farm/firm would only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits. 
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and high uncertainty and appropriability, 
could be effectively governed through a special contract. Relational contract is applied when 
detailed terms of transacting are not known at outset (high uncertainty), and framework (mutual 
expectations) rather than specification of obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from 
opportunism and are motivated to settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of 
frequent bilateral trade). Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be 
easily/costlessly redeployed to another use/users (no assets dependency exist). The special 
contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with low uncertainty, high specificity and 
                                                        
28 Williamson О. (1981). The Economics of Organization. The American Journal of Sociology 87 (3), 548–577. 
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appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded through contract 
provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of partners in all possible 
contingencies (no uncertainty). Here occasional character of transactions does not justify 
internalization within the farm/firm.   
Figure 1. Principle modes for governing of agrarian transactions 
            Critical dimensions of transactions 
                 Appropriability 
                     High    Low 
              Assets Specificity 
       Low       High 
                Uncertainty 
     Low High Low High 
                Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 
Free market   h  h        
Special contract     h    h    
Internal organization      h   h   
Third-party involvement      K      K  
Public intervention            K 
h - the most effective mode; K - necessity for a third party involvement 
 
Transactions with high frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity/dependency, and 
appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm (internal ownership mode). For 
instance, managerial and technological knowledge (acquaintance with livestock, quality of 
farming plots) is quite specific to farm, and its supply has to be governed through permanent 
labor contract and coupled with ownership rights (products, assets). Capital investments in land 
are to be made on owned/long-leased-in rather than seasonally rented land (high site and product 
specificity). All “critical” to farm material assets will be internally organized - production of 
forage for animals; important machineries; water supply for irrigated farming etc. While 
universal capital could be effectively financed by market form (bank credit), highly specific 
investments can be only made through internal funding (own funds, equity sell, joint venture). 
If the specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm 
(economy of scale/scope explored, funding made), then an effective governing form(s) outside 
farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying for 
public intervention. When strong assets (capacity, technology, time of delivery, site, branding) 
inter-dependency with upstream/downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to govern 
transactions through contract mode (strong mutual interests for cooperation and restriction of 
opportunism). For instance, effective supply/procurement contracts between farmers and 
processors are widely used in dairy, meat, vine, organic industries (symmetrical dependency). 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need effective (ownership) 
organization to protect interests. Transacting costs for initiation and maintaining of such 
“collective organization” is usually great (big number of coalition, different interests of 
members, “free-riding”) and it is either unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That creates 
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serious problems for efficiency/sustainability of individual farms - missing markets, 
monopoly/quasi-monopoly situation, impossibility to “induce” public intervention. 
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined with 
high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Here elaboration of special governing 
structure for private transacting is not justified, specific investments not made, and 
activity/restriction of activity fails to occur at effective scale (“market and contract failure”). 
Similar difficulties are encountered for rare transacting associated with high uncertainty and 
appropriability. In all these cases, a third-part (private, NGO, public) involvement in 
transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more 
efficient or possible. A particular trilateral mode is also invented such as the neoclassical 
contract which arranges “third party participation” and manages transactions with high 
uncertainty and asset specificity, and low frequency. The unprecedented development of special 
origins, organic farming, systems of “fair-trade” are good examples. There is increasing 
consumer’s demand (premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products. Nevertheless their 
supply could not be met unless effective trilateral governance including independent 
certification and control is put in place. 
When appropriability associated with transaction/activity is low, there is no pure market 
mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Respecting others rights (unwanted exchange 
avoided) or “granting” additional rights to others could be governed by “good will” or charity 
actions of individual and NGOs. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental 
initiatives have emerged driven by the competition, farmers’ preferences for eco-production, or 
responds to public pressure for a sound eco-management. In any case, voluntary initiatives 
could hardly satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require significant costs. 
Some private modes could be employed if high frequency and mutual assets dependency 
exists such as unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, 
close-membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal organization. 
However, emerging of special (private) large-members organizations for dealing with low 
appropriability (and satisfying entire “social” demand) would be very slow and expensive, and 
they unlikely be sustainable in long run (free riding). Therefore, there is a strong need for 
third-party public intervention in order to make such activity possible or more effective – public 
organization, public contract, mandatory taxing, introduction of new property rights. For 
example, the supply of “environmental goods” by farmers could hardly be governed through 
private contracts with individual consumers because of low appropriability, high uncertainty, 
and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, charging potential 
consumers, disputing). The supply of environmental protection service is very costly 
(production and organization costs) and would unlikely be carried out on voluntary basis. 
Financial compensation of farmers by willing consumers through pure market mode (tax, 
premium) is also ineffective due to high information asymmetry and massive enforcement costs. 
A third-party mode with direct public involvement would make that transaction effective: on 
behalf of consumers a State agency negotiates with individual farmers a public contract for 
“environment conservation service”, coordinates activities of various agents (including direct 
production management), provides public payments for compensation of farmers, and controls 
implementation of negotiated terms29. 
                                                        
29 Namely public eco-contracts with farmers are widely used in countries of European Union. 
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Economic boundaries of the farm  
 
The next step is to identify the range of feasible organizational forms for each generic 
mode for the specific context of a particular country, region, subsectors, and agent. For instance, 
specific varieties of the “internal organization” in agriculture includes: one-person farm or firm, 
family farm or firm, group farm or firm (partnership), cooperative, corporation, public farm or 
firm, joint venture. Corresponding forms of the “free market” are: spot exchange on local, 
regional etc. markets; classical contract, wholesale trade etc. The “special contract form” could 
be: short-term contract, long-term contract, relational contract, interlinked organization, 
multilateral agreement etc. For completing the list of alternative organisational forms in each 
generic type a special micro-economic survey is needed. 
After that it could be determined the effective (horizontal and vertical) boundaries of 
individual forms on the basis if their potential to: overcome bounded rationality and transaction 
uncertainty, safeguard transactions and investments from the hazard of opportunism, realized 
economies of scale/size of specialized and specific capital, and minimized overall (production 
and transaction) costs. Achieving the efficiency though increasing productivity/benefits and the 
transaction costs for each form will be quite different in the specific institutional, economic and 
natural environment for agents with unlike characteristics and activity/transactions with specific 
combination of critical dimensions. Therefore, individual organizations will have quite different 
efficiency and effective boundaries. A part of agrarian transactions will be effectively governed 
through free market exchange; another part will be effectively organized through special 
contract mode(s); a part of transactions will be entirely integrated within farms of different types, 
while the rest protected though special private organization(s) outside of farm gates.  
Detailed analysis of factors, pace of development, efficiency and economics boundaries of 
farms and agrarian organizations of different type during transition and EU integration in 
Bulgaria is done by us in previous publications30. For instance, the high efficiency and 
sustainability of numerous small (subsistent, semi market and market) farms is “explained” with 
the absence of another feasible or more-effective alternative for production utilization of 
available household resources (labor, savings, farmland) 31  in the condition of not-fully 
restituted private rights on resources; high uncertainty, risk and costs for market and contract 
transactions (lack of experience, trust, markets, financing; not-working system for enforcement 
of laws and contracts); lack of public support; insufficient or missing possibilities for alternative 
employment and/or supply with (cheap, quality) foods32.  
Similarly, “dynamic” development of many-members agricultural cooperatives during 
post-communist transition is a consequence of the fact that they are the single/most effective 
form for organization of a great part of activity (joint cultivation, plat protection, irrigation, 
harvesting; non-for-profit organization for supply of highly specific for members  employment, 
foods, services, feeds for domestic/private farm livestock) in the conditions of unidentified 
rights on major agrarian resources, lack of possibilities (skills, financial means, time, advanced 
age) for organization of own farm, inherited high inter-dependency of available specialized 
                                                        
30 Bachev H. (2010). Management of Farm Contracts and Competitiveness, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag. 
31 Post 1989 privatization turned more than 2 million Bulgarians into owners of small farmland plots and shares in 
the property (animals, equipment, indivisible assets) of ancient public farms 
32 Even now the most of holdings in the country are subsistent or semi-market, and agriculture is a “supplementary 
income source” for more than 1 million Bulgarians (Аgrarian paper, МAF, 2008). 
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capital of large number individuals33, and undeveloped labor market, agrarian resources and 
main activities (services, processing, trade) in rural areas. 
In the same way, the unprecedented concentration of resources and activities in a few 
thousands large business agri-firms is a result of the dynamic institutional environment 
favorable for integration of huge specific capital by entrepreneur (technological and managerial 
knowledge, personal connections, available combination of and/or complementarities of 
partners assets) allowing exploration of enormous (land consolidation, economies of size and 
scale, cheap and standardized products) and transaction advantages (contract and political power, 
preferable counterpart by large suppliers and buyers, possibilities to collect information, 
introduction of innovations, diversification, products promotion, adaptation to market and 
formal requirements, winning public projects and subsidies, risk taking, investing in good 
reputation and relations with partners, banks, research institutes, and public authorities).    
At this stage a qualitative analysis is made on the comparative efficiency of diverse type of 
farms and agrarian organizations in the specific socio-economic, institutional and natural 
environment. It is often impossible to co-measure production and transaction costs in a 
qualitative term, but such “calculation” is always done by the business managers and other 
economic agents. Also an answer is given to the “paradox” why a big farm can not do the same 
and more then a number of small farms can do, and vice verse. Furthermore, it becomes clear 
inadequacy of indicators for productivity of production costs and resources for assessing 
efficiency of the different agrarian organizations. The opposite is to be expected: it has to be 
significant variation in the rate of profitability on investments in agro-firm (profit-making 
organization) from “pay-back” of expenditures and resources in cooperative (member-oriented 
organization), public farm (non-for-profit organization) or subsistence farm (giving opportunity 
for productive use of otherwise “non-tradable” family labor, land). The later is also proven by 
the estimates on “efficiency” of different farms in East Europe after 198934.  
Traditional statistical and other data are less suitable for testing and wide application of the 
new approach. It is necessary to collect micro-economic data for divers transaction managed by 
various agrarian agents and their critical dimensions. Such information can be collected though 
organizing interviews with managers of different type farms and the experts in the area. 
 
Needs and effective forms for public intervention  
 
The Comparative structural analysis let specify existing and emerging deficiencies in 
organization of market and private transactions, and define the needs for public intervention in 
agrarian sector (“the economic role of government”). In modern agriculture there are always 
some public modes put in place along with diverse market and private organizations, and 
iideally it could be a case of most effective/perfect economic governance of the sector. However, 
usually there are a number of social, economic, environmental etc. challenges (problems, 
conflicts, failures, risks) associated with agrarian development. That is why, there is a constant 
                                                        
33 Restituted widely dispersed small-scale land plots, farmland within a large plot with permanent crops, physically 
“indivisible” shares in assets of ancient farms, accumulated experience and narrow labor specialization for 
“collective” production.  
34 Csáki C. and Z. Lerman (2000). Structural change in the farming sectors in CЕЕ. Washington DC; Gortova M. 
and S.Davidova (2003). Farm productivity and efficiency in the CEE applicant countries, Elsevier; Mathijs E. and J. 
Swinnen (1997). Production Organization and Efficiency during Transition, Policy Research Group. 
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need for improvement of public organization.   
First, assessment on correspondence of public involvement to real needs of development – 
these are identified needs for a third-party intervention from Figure 1. The analysis is to 
embrace the efficiency of entire system of governance, and identify deficiencies (failures, risks) 
in market, private, and public organizations. Next, variety of alternative modes for new public 
intervention able to correct market, private and public failures have to be identified, and their 
comparative efficiency assessed, and most efficient one(s) selected. Finally, assessment is to be 
made on comparative efficiency of selected public form to other practically possible modes of 
governance such as partnership with private sector, fundamental property rights modernization, 
international cooperation etc. Accordingly, a new public intervention is to be initiated only if 
there is overall net benefit - when effects are greater than additional (individual and social) 
costs for third-party public involvement.   
The comparative efficiency of public interventions is to be determined I terms of the 
potential for coordination, stimulation, conflicts resolution, and minimization of (transaction) 
costs. Public modes not only assist (market and private) transactions, but also are associated 
with significant (social and private) costs. It is essential to compare practically (technically, 
economically, socially) possible and alternative forms of governance. Additional benefits 
(problems to be solved, risks to be overcome, new goals to be achieved), and costs, and modes 
for new public intervention must be socially acceptable. If different forms permit achieving the 
same goals, then the analysis is to focus on selection of mode minimizing total (implementing 
and transacting) costs. If there is only one feasible form for governing of a particular 
intervention, it will be introduced if associated costs are socially acceptable and possible.  
Assessment is to comprise all costs – direct (tax payer, assistance agency) expenses, and 
transacting costs of bureaucracy (for coordination, stimulation, mismanagement), and costs for 
individuals’ participation and usage of public modes (expenses for information, paper works, 
payments of fees, bribes), and costs for community control over and for reorganization of 
bureaucracy (modernization and liquidation), and (opportunity) costs of public inaction. 
Depending on uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific investment of public 
involvement, there will be different the most effective forms (Figure 2). Generally, interventions 
with low uncertainty and assets specificity would require smaller public organization (more 
regulatory modes; improvement of general laws and contract enforcement). When uncertainty 
and assets specificity of transactions increases a special contract mode would be necessary – 
employment of public contracts for provision of private services, public funding/subsidies of 
private activities, temporary labor contract for carrying out special public programs, leasing-out 
public assets for private management etc. When transactions are characterized with high assets 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency then internal mode and bigger public organization would 
be necessary – permanent public employment contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in 
a specialized state agency or public company etc.  
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Figure 2: Effective modes for public intervention in agrarian sector 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                          ←-----------------------------------→                          High 
New property rights 
and enforcements 
New regulations New taxation New assistance  
and support 
New public 
provision 
 
Initially, existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in organization 
of market and private transactions have to be specified. The appropriate pubic involvement 
would be to create environment for: decreasing uncertainty surrounding market and private 
transactions, increasing intensity of exchange, protecting private rights and investments, and 
making private investments less dependent. For instance, State establishes and enforces quality, 
safety and eco-standards, certifies producers, regulates employment relations, transfers 
management rights on natural resources etc., and all that facilitates and intensifies (market and 
private) transactions and increases the efficiency of economic organizations.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have to be 
considered35. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private 
rights. In some cases, most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce 
new private property rights – on natural and biological resources; tradable quotas for products, 
inputs, emissions; intellectual property and origins. That is efficient when privatization of 
resources or introduction and enforcement of the new rights is not associated with significant 
costs (uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific investment are low). That intervention 
transfers organization of transactions into market and private governance, liberalizes market 
competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain agrarian activities.  
In other instances, it is more efficient to put in place regulations for trade and utilization of 
resources, products and services – standards for labor (safety, social security), product quality, 
environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, introduction of 
foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; ban on application 
of certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service protection; 
foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and licensing of farm operators.  
In other instances, using incentives and restrictions of tax system is the most effective form 
for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences are widely used to create favourable 
conditions for development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, forms of organization, segment 
of population, or types of activities. For instance, environmental taxation on emissions or 
products (inputs, outputs of production) is applied to reduce use or emissions of harmful 
substances.  
In some cases, public support to private organizations is best mode for intervention. 
Agrarian and rural development, environmental conservation and trans-border cooperation 
programs are widely used in all countries. Often providing public information, recommendations, 
and training to farmers, rural population, and consumers is the most efficient form. In some 
cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) is the most effective as 
in case of important agro-ecosystems and national parks; agrarian research, education and 
                                                        
35 E.g. assessment of the efficiency of major forms of public intervention in agro-ecosystem services are presented 
by Bachev, H. (2009). Governing of Agro-ecosystem Services. Modes, Efficiency, Perspectives, VDM Verlag. 
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extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control etc. 
Usually, specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of public 
intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by: 
complementarities (joint effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some less expensive 
forms to achieve certain (but not entire) level of socially preferred outcome; possibility to get 
extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for participation in public programs); 
particularity of problems to be tackled; specific critical dimensions of governed activity; 
uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with likely impact of new forms; 
administrative and financial capability of Government to fund, control, and implement different 
modes; and dominating policy doctrine. 
The level of effective public intervention (governance) also depends on the kind of 
problem and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be executed at 
local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require nationwide governance. And 
finally, there are activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at international (regional, 
European, worldwide) level due to strong necessity for trans-border actions (needs for 
cooperation in natural resources management, exploration of economies of scale and scale, 
governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) government failures. Very frequently 
effective governance of many problems and risks requires multilevel governance with system of 
combined actions at various levels involving diverse range of actors and geographical scales. 
The public (regulatory, provision, inspecting) modes must have built mechanisms for 
increasing competency (decrease bounded rationality, powerlessness) of bureaucrats, 
beneficiaries, interests groups and public as well as restricting possible opportunism (cheating, 
interlinking, abuse of power) of public officers and stakeholders. That could be made by training, 
introducing new assessment and communication technologies, increasing transparency 
(independent assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in 
management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying “market like” mechanisms 
(competition, public auctions) in projects design, selection and implementation also increase 
incentives and decrease overall costs. 
The pure public organization should be used as a “last resort” when all other modes do 
not work effectively. “In-house” public organization has higher (direct/indirect) costs for setting 
up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. Unlike market and private forms there 
is not automatic mechanism (competition) for sorting out less-effective modes36. Here public 
“decision-making” is required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is influenced 
by strong private interests (lobbying groups, policy makers and associates, bureaucrats) rather 
than efficiency. What is more, widespread “inefficiency by design” of public modes is practiced 
to secure (rent-taking) positions of certain interest groups, stakeholders, bureaucrats. Along with 
development of general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”, transparency) and 
measurement, communication etc. technologies, the efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, 
information, recommendation) and contract forms would get bigger advantages over internal 
less flexible public arrangements. 
The hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure public 
forms given coordination, incentives, and control advantages. Involvement of farmers, 
beneficiaries and interest groups increases efficiency, decreases asymmetry of information, 
                                                        
36 Around the world there are a lot ineffective but highly “sustainable” public organizations. 
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restricts opportunisms, increases incentives for private costs-sharing, reduces management costs. 
That is determined by farmers information superiority, strong interlinks of activity with 
traditional food production (economy of scope), high assets specificity to farm (farmers 
competence, high cite-specificity of investments to farm, land, eco-system), spatial 
interdependency (needs for cooperation of farmers at ecosystem or regional level), farm’s origin 
of negative externalities. For instance, enforcement of most labor, animal welfare, 
environmental standards is often very difficult or impossible. Stimulating and supporting 
(assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are much more effective then mandatory 
public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs.   
If there is strong need for third-party public involvement but effective (government, local 
authority, international assistance) intervention is not introduced in a due time, agrarian 
“development” is substantially deformed. The public (Government) failure is also possible and 
often prevails. In Bulgaria, there have been a great number of bad examples for public under- 
and over-interventions in agrarian sector during post-communist transition now. Consequently, 
primitive and uncompetitive small-scale farming; predominance of over-integrated and 
personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out all class 
of agrarian transactions (innovation and extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of 
infrastructure and environmental goods); and developed large informal sector, all they come out. 
The comparative analysis let us improve design of new forms of public intervention 
according to specific market, institutional and natural environment of a particular country, 
region, sub-sector, and in terms of perfection of coordination, adaptation, information, 
stimulation, restriction of opportunism, controlling of participating actors (decision-makers, 
implementers, beneficiaries, other stakeholders). It unable us to predict likely cases of new 
public (local, national, international) failures due to impossibility to mobilize sufficient political 
support and necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies 
in specific economic and institutional environment of a particular country, region, sub-sector. 
Since public failure is a feasible option its timely detection permits foreseeing the persistence or 
rising of certain problems in agrarian development, and informing (local, international) 
community about associated risks.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In the unreal economy “without institutions and transaction costs” the theory of agrarian 
organization is very simple - there is no economic need for organizations. There is a single 
mechanism for governing organizing, coordinating, and stimulating the entire economic 
activities – the free market. “Situation of efficiency” is easily achieved since agrarian agents 
(individuals, households, firms) automatically and costlessly adapt behavior according to 
movements of market prices and changes in production technologies. In the real agrarian 
economy with diverse agents, institutions and transaction costs there is place for other effective 
(non-market) modes for organization – farms of different types and sizes, contracts, public and 
hybrid forms. “The old” problem of efficiency founds a “new” dimension through incorporation 
into analysis of the costs of transacting as the accent is put on assessment of the comparative 
efficiency of all (rather then only a part) of alternative modes for economic organization. It also 
becomes absurd the traditional “black box” approach in analysis of governing structures and the 
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productivity as a sole indicator for efficiency of different type of farms. 
Suggested new framework helps us better understand the factors for organizational choice 
and efficiency, and needs for public intervention in agrarian sector. The analysis of transaction 
costs identifies immense range of “market failures” associated with badly specified property 
rights and inefficient system for their enforcement; the high uncertainty and dependency of 
activity, low appropriability etc. Private agents “deal” with market deficiency developing 
different non-market forms for effective governance such as contracts, internal modes, trilateral 
private organization, collective actions. Private sector also “fails” to safeguard individual rights 
and carry out certain activities at effective scale (technological development, eco-management). 
There is strong need for a third-party public involvement in market and private transactions 
though institutional modernization, assistance, regulation, hybrid or in-house public 
organization. Diverse forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency in the specific 
environment of individual countries, regions, and sectors, and the most efficient ones are to be 
selected taking into account the transaction costs and contribution to sustainable development. 
The “public failure” is also possible, and inappropriate involvements, under or over-regulations, 
mismanagement, corruption are widespread. Agrarian sustainability is compromised when 
market and private sector fails, and no effective public intervention takes place - imperfect 
institutional structure is not reformed, delayed or bad government interventions prevail, fruitless 
international assistance dominate, and needed global governance is not established. 
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